


#48

9 Feb 2001

*USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER*

# *CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL*

*Air University  
Air War College  
Maxwell AFB, Alabama*



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Defense News  
February 5, 2001  
Pg. 15

## **Revamp U.S. Nuclear Policy**

### ***Broad Review Must Tackle 21st Century Challenges***

By Theresa Hitchens

The U.S. Defense Secretary now Donald Rumsfeld has been tasked by Congress to lead a reexamination of the role of U.S. nuclear forces in the 21st century.

He should — politely, of course — decline the honor.

The reason? With all due respect to Mr. Rumsfeld's experience and capabilities, the job is simply too big for any defense secretary.

The FY2001 National Defense Authorization Act charges Rumsfeld, along with new Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham, with undertaking a Nuclear Posture Review. But in explaining the goals of the review and detailing the elements that should be included, Congress very clearly signaled that it expects a fundamental reassessment of how nuclear weapons relate to U.S. foreign policy and national security.

The defense authorization act, passed in August, mandates that the review examine, among other issues:

- \* The role of nuclear forces in U.S. military strategy, planning and programming.

- \* The policy requirements and objectives for the United States to maintain a safe, reliable and credible nuclear deterrence posture.

- \* The relationship among U.S. nuclear deterrence policy, targeting strategy and arms control objectives.

It is apparent that the answers to these questions will require input not just from the Defense and Energy departments, but from all the members of President George W. Bush's national security team, including Secretary of State Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice, national security adviser.

Setting U.S. arms control objectives, for example, is a task that lies squarely in the domain of the State Department, not Defense or Energy. The questions asked by the Congress go far beyond a simple posture review looking at the numbers and status of the current arsenal.

In other words, to be true to the spirit of the mandate set out by the Republican dominated 106th Congress, Mr. Bush needs to order, and ensure direct White House charge of, a full-fledged nuclear policy review.

And it is high time for such a broad rethinking of U.S. nuclear policy. The last major examination of U.S. nuclear forces happened in 1994, under President Bill Clinton. While the exercise started out as a sweeping policy review, domestic pressures, and lack of presidential leadership, soon ground it down to nothing more than another official stamp of the status quo.

"We have not had a meaningful policy review since 1982," retired Gen. (ret.) Lee Butler, former commander of U.S. Strategic Command, said in August, in written answers to questions from the British American Security Information Council. (BASIC).

Butler served as the head of U.S. nuclear forces under Mr. now Secretary of State Colin Powell during Powell's former incarnation as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Unfortunately, this means that U.S. nuclear policy remains largely based on Cold War assumptions and logic. Mr. Bush already has recognized this, promising during his election campaign to "reduce the number of American nuclear weapons significantly," and to "lower the alert status" of the thousands of weapons remaining on hair-trigger.

It would be slightly unfair, however, to say there have been no changes to U.S. nuclear war plans since the height of the Cold War, as there was presidential guidance on nuclear planning issued in 1997. That guidance, known as PDD60, provides the current foundation for the Pentagon's blueprint for nuclear war, the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP).

While the specifics of both PDD60 and the SIOP are classified, since 1997 there have been a number of reports by independent analysts and the U.S. media (including in Defense News) outlining some new elements.

For example, in "Cold War Era Assumptions Drive U.S. Nuclear Force Levels: Why the Target List Should Shrink," published May 18, 2000, by the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers, Dr. Bruce Blair asserted that the nuclear target list actually has grown as the Cold War has wound down.

Blair, president of the Center for Defense Information, explained that targets in China were added to the more than 2,000 in Russia.

Current military doctrine, based on PDD60, also cites the need for nuclear weapons into the foreseeable future, raising serious doubts about the U.S. government's intent to uphold its promise as a signatory of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to pursue nuclear disarmament.

The United States renewed that commitment in May at the NPT's 2000 Review Conference, pledging along with the other nuclear haves, to "an unequivocal undertaking ... to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament."

That commitment was reiterated by outgoing U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen and his fellow NATO defense ministers at their Dec. 1415 meeting in Brussels. The final communiqué states, "We confirm our full support and commitment to the implementation of the conclusions of the NPT Review Conference, which agreed on the importance of universal adherence to and compliance with the NPT, and reaffirmed the commitment of all States Parties to disarmament."

The problem is that stated U.S. nuclear policy and military doctrine are not only outdated, but also badly out of sync, a possibly dangerous state of affairs that could, in that the contradictions confuse not only enemies but also allies about U.S. intentions.

And there are a host of other nuclear policy issues at hand: the effect of the National Missile Defense program on global nuclear security; maintenance of the current arsenal vs. modernization and/or new weapons development; and the future of the languishing Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

It therefore behooves Mr. Bush to lead a broad and deep review of U.S. nuclear policy, as well as the numbers and types of weapons and targets. The process should be as open as possible, and should start from a blank slate — i.e., asking the fundamental questions about why the United States spends billions every year to maintain thousands of nuclear weapons and their massively expensive delivery systems.

All options for the arsenal's future should be considered, from the Heritage Foundation's plan for building a new generation of smaller yield weapons, to the suggestion by Paul H. Nitze, chief arms controller under President Ronald Reagan, administration official Paul H. Nitze's suggestion for unilateral disarmament, made in a New York Times opinion piece published in October 1999.

The goal of this wide-ranging effort, however, must be clear: to make decisions about the U.S. nuclear arsenal based on 21st century national security needs, defined in the widest sense. Without strong, fearless and unbiased leadership at the top, however, the more likely outcome will be a yearlong exercise by the Defense Department and Energy Department DoD and DoE bureaucracy, which have obvious vested interests, in justifying their jobs and today's perilous nuclear status quo.

*Theresa Hitchens is research director for the British American Security Information Council, Washington and London.*

Washington Times

February 7, 2001

Pg. 4

## **Joint U.S.-Russia Exercises Heighten Fears Of Espionage**

By Bill Gertz, The Washington Times

The Pentagon is conducting joint missile defense exercises with the Russian military in Colorado, raising concerns among defense analysts that Moscow will gain valuable information on U.S. war-fighting tactics.

A Pentagon official said the computer simulation exercises at the National Training Facility in Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado, grew out of a summit meeting between President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin in 1999. The military cooperation was reaffirmed at a summit in September with current Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The first phase of the current exercise scenario involves American and Russian forces working together against an unidentified third country that attacks with ballistic missiles, said the official who spoke only on the condition of anonymity.

The two sides will then coordinate communications, warning and control information for shooting down incoming short-range missiles.

A later phase will take place at Fort Bliss, Texas, in January 2002 using hardware in what the defense official said were "limited field-training exercises."

The 30 Russian officers now working in Colorado will pretend to be operating Russia's S-300 anti-missile systems and some 70 U.S. military officers will practice using Patriot anti-missile systems.

The exercise is being paid for by the Pentagon, and the first phase will cost \$735,000 when it is completed Sunday. It is the third joint U.S.-Russia exercise.

"It's all designed for us to work together in a theater so that we can protect our forces and objects," said the defense official.

The American and Russian soldiers will practice "how to coordinate and communicate in engaging targets in a theater of operations."

The exercises have prompted fears that Moscow will obtain war-fighting data that could be passed on to Russian clients like Iran.

"This seems to me to be typical of the type of thing arranged by the last administration that should be suspended until the new administration has a chance to review it," said William Van Cleave, director of the Center for Defense and Strategic Studies at Southwest Missouri State University in Springfield, Mo.

The idea of cooperating with the Russians may have some merits, he said in an interview. "But there are lot of problems sharing information and technology with the Russians," Mr. Van Cleave said. "With our long experience with the Russians, there is usually an intelligence-gathering objective of meetings of this type."

Defense officials said the Russians used their access to U.S. military missile warning technology in Colorado during a joint year 2000 rollover exchange in December 1999.

At that time, Russian military forces fired Scud missiles against Chechen rebels in southern Russia at the same time its officers were posted at a missile warning center in Colorado.

U.S. intelligence officials believe the Russians fired the Scud so the Russians in Colorado could gauge how well U.S. space sensors track missile firings. By learning the sensitivity of the sensors, the Russian military can then develop the means to hide the missiles or deceive U.S. spy satellites.

A congressional defense aide said the joint exercise is "one more bad idea from the Clinton administration that will haunt the Bush administration."

"It is a good example of the kinds of problems [Defense Secretary Donald H.] Rumsfeld is going to have to root out," the aide said. "The idea of joint action with the Russians against Russian clients is not even a bad joke."

Russia has stepped up military cooperation with Iran following disclosure in December of a secret agreement between Vice President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin.

The agreement called on the United States to avoid sanctioning Russia for arms sales to Iran in exchange for an end to the sales in December 1999. Russia continued dealing arms and has stepped up transfers in recent months, U.S. intelligence officials have said.

U.S.-Russia relations have soured in recent months over plans for a U.S. national missile defense system, which Moscow opposes. Moscow also has raised U.S. and NATO concerns by moving tactical nuclear weapons to the Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad, U.S. officials said. Moscow denied the claim.

Rep. Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Republican and a member of the House Armed Services Committee, said the missile defense exchanges seem "very ill-conceived."

"I support engagement, but not engagement that is not totally thought through," Mr. Weldon said. "I would hope Secretary Rumsfeld is fully briefed on these programs."

The defense official dismissed suggestions that the exercises will benefit Russian's intelligence services and said security arrangements call for using "generic" battlefield information to avoid compromises.

"They are not going to see how we tactically deploy," he said.

Korea Times

February 7, 2001

## **NK Seeking Purchase Of Missiles From Russia**

North Korea has been seeking to purchase Russian interceptor missiles and assemble Russian fighters in its territory, a military source said yesterday.

"It is highly likely that North Korea will buy S-300 interceptor missiles from Russia by the end of the year," the source said, noting that North Korea and Russia, through a basic agreement signed by the two nations in February last year, have been increasing defense equipment transactions.

"I understand that the two countries (North Korea and Russia) were discussing ways to allow North Korea to assemble Russia's SU-27 or MiG-29 fighters in North Korea," the source said.

Russia has also been discussing the sale of 10 BTR-80 armored personnel carriers and 100 BMP tanks to North Korea, the source said.

San Antonio Express-News  
February 7, 2001

## Leakers Show Need For Defense

By Austin Bay

They're called leakers, and they're a Star Warrior's technological challenge. For diplomats, the threat they represent calls for new approaches to collective security.

Let's deal with the tech first. These leakers aren't Washington insiders slipping tips to the press, they're missile warheads penetrating a "layered" anti-missile defense.

In 1997 at Ft. Bliss, I watched a "leaker" strike near a U.S. military unit. At least, I watched the attack in a detailed computer exercise conducted by the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO).

Scuds shot skyward. Sensors detected their launch signatures. USAF Airborne Laser started picking off Scuds in boost phase. Moments later, Navy Aegis and Army Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) started intercepting warheads. As the warheads plunged, Patriots nailed the leftovers. Except for one, a red missile icon on the screen, seconds ticking off to Ground Zero.

Analysis revealed an ill-positioned radar failed to detect the bad guy.

Back to the drawing board? Facile fodder for critics who argue if one warhead gets through any missile defense is wasted effort?

Don't make it more than what it was: a "what if" examining ways to link decision makers, sensors and weapons, part of the long process of creating effective defenses against missile attack (and The Discovery Channel videotaped part of the exercise).

I asked a spokesman if the "leaker" had been detected by satellites. Answer: "Yes." Could a satellite direct the interceptor missile? Cryptic response: "Not played in this scenario." Snooping revealed strict interpreters of the 1972 ABM treaty argue space assets can't target for ABMs, only treaty-sanctified ground radars.

The experience underscored several truths missile defense advocates and responsible critics acknowledge. Hitting a bullet with a bullet is a tough mission. It's expensive. If you learn from mistakes, failure is part of the process of success.

But only the willfully blind ignore the message North Korea sent in August 1998 when Pyongyang fired a multi-stage missile and confounded Clinton administration risk estimates. That real-world launch demonstrated that the United States, like our allies in Europe, like Japan, like the rest of the world, is vulnerable to rogue missile attack, and it's false to argue otherwise.

No one on the planet escapes this threat — which is why some form of "global missile protection" makes strategic sense, politically and militarily.

Are there technical difficulties? You bet. Though Patriot PAC-3 has demonstrated hit-to-kill capability against both ballistic and cruise missiles, missile defense is leading-edge technology. The Airborne Laser is no longer Buck Rogers — it can blast — but operational range is an issue.

However, the technology is evolving — failures have led to success — and strategic thinking must evolve.

Missile defense could be one of three "centerpieces" for a new collective defense. (The other two are counter-terror cooperation and anti-proliferation regimens for weapons of mass destruction.)

The Bush administration should look beyond NMD to multi-national defense, a system that protects the cooperative from the destructive. Joining this "defense club" becomes a mark of sanity and stability. Nations which remain outside the umbrella make an open statement about their long-range goals.

Mutually Assured Defense? Defense is never assured — there will always be rogues and potential "leakers." But in order to have "leakers" there must be a defensive system in place, otherwise there is only naked vulnerability, a world where sociopaths are certain New York, London, Moscow and Beijing are names for Ground Zero.

*Austin Bay is an Austin writer who analyzes military, intelligence and regional issues.*

## Russia Draws Proposals to Halve Chemical Weapons Destruction Costs

MOSCOW, Feb 7, 2001 -- ([Military News Agency](#)) Director-General of the Russian Ammunition Agency Zinovy Pak announced on Tuesday Russia's proposals aimed at halving the cost of the chemical disarmament program. Pak was speaking at a meeting with Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Jose Bustani. His proposals concerned elimination of Russian stocks of poisonous substances and their production sites.

The proposals have yet to be approved by President Vladimir Putin, after which they will be submitted to the Organization, Pak told the Military News Agency after the meeting. Russia is hoping that the proposals will be endorsed, as there is a necessity to optimize expenses, he said....

<http://www.russiatoday.com:80/news.php3?id=283995>

## **Russia Counting on U.S. Funds for Chemical Weapons Scrapping Program**

MOSCOW, Feb 7, 2001 -- ([Military News Agency](#)) U.S. Congress may resume provision of financial support for the Russian chemical weapons scrapping program in 2002, Russian Ammunition Agency Director-General Zinovy Pak said on Tuesday.

Under the previous agreement, the United States allocated USD 285 Million for that purpose and was planning to provide USD 880 Million more for construction of a chemical weapons scrapping plant in the town of Shchuchye in the south-western Siberian Kurgan region, Pak told the Military News Agency commenting on his visit to the USA....

<http://www.russiatoday.com:80/news.php3?id=283994>

Audit Report  
Inspector General  
Department of Defense

## **Management of National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams**

Report No. D-2001-043

January 31, 2001

<http://www.dodig.osd.mil/audit/reports/01-043pt1.pdf>

(Editors note: Report above mentioned in Outreach #47, article, Bloomberg.com, February 4, 2001  
Pentagon Mismanaged Chemical And Bio Defense Team, Audit Says,  
By Tony Capaccio)

## **Iraq disgruntled at resumption of UN arms control**

Iraq has linked the resumption of permanent United Nations control over its arms to a lifting of the crippling decade-old sanctions regime and a similar control over Israel's military arsenal.

Secretary of state for foreign affairs, Nabil Nejm, told Al-Rafidain newspaper that Iraq does not approve of the return of arms inspectors.

"We do not accept the return of international inspectors, and any related question of permanent control can only be raised once the embargo is lifted," he said....

<http://www.abc.net.au/news/newslink/weekly/newsnat-6feb2001-104.htm>

New York Times  
February 9, 2001

## **Russia Vows To Start Destroying Chemical Arms**

By Patrick E. Tyler

MOSCOW, Feb. 8 — Russia pledged this week that it would finally begin destroying 40,000 tons of lethal chemical weapons — the largest stockpile in the world — this summer, Western officials said.

In meetings with José Bustani, who heads the secretariat that enforces the Chemical Weapons Convention signed by 130 countries, Zinovy Pak, director of the Russian Munitions Agency, said funds for the destruction of chemical arms had been increased sixfold this year to \$105 million. A plan to begin operating the first of three destruction plants will be presented to President Vladimir V. Putin next month.

The first plant is nearing completion at Gorny, 660 miles southeast of Moscow. American assistance to construct a second plant at Shchuchye, 1,100 miles southeast of Moscow, remains frozen.

Mr. Pak told Mr. Bustani that under the plan, former Russian chemical warfare troops would begin to drill holes into 400 tons of nerve gas shells and neutralize their contents using equipment once intended to destroy leaking shells in combat conditions.

"The world has grounds to doubt that Russia will cope with the obligations to eliminate chemical weapons that it undertook in 1993," Mr. Pak told reporters after meeting Mr. Bustani on Tuesday. "Unfortunately, Russia failed to accomplish first-stage tasks that envisaged elimination of one percent of the chemical weapons stocks — 400 tons — by the end of 2000."

The United States and other Western nations had been assisting Russia's preparations to destroy its chemical arms, but Congress froze money for the project after Moscow missed its deadline. The funds, up to \$50 million a year, can be restored if Moscow puts in place a well-financed program.

The United States has already destroyed about 15 percent of its chemical weapons stockpile.

Toronto Globe and Mail  
February 8, 2001

## **PM Changes Tone On Missile Shield**

*Ottawa's rhetoric shift follows Chrétien's visit with Bush, Eggleton's talk with Powell*

By Paul Koring

WASHINGTON -- Ottawa has subtly shifted its rhetoric on President George W. Bush's controversial antimissile defence shield, from echoing the Kremlin's objections to stressing close continental military co-operation.

Less than two months ago, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien stood shoulder-to-shoulder with Russian President

Vladimir Putin and called the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which outlaws the kind of antimissile defence Mr. Bush vows to deploy, a "cornerstone of strategic stability."

But Mr. Chrétien sounded very different this week, after an Oval Office tête-à-tête with Mr. Bush.

Mr. Chrétien echoed the phraseology of the hawkish Donald Rumsfeld, the U.S. Defence Secretary and perhaps the most ardent proponent of a so-called national missile defence system (NMD). Mr. Rumsfeld believes the ABM treaty is an irrelevant relic from the Cold War, signed with a country, the Soviet Union, that no longer exists.

"Perhaps we are in a different era," Mr. Chrétien said, repeating the claim made repeatedly by Mr. Bush and Mr. Rumsfeld, to justify redrafting or scrapping the ABM treaty. "But," the Prime Minister added, "we did not go into the details of saying that this treaty is irrelevant."

Mr. Chrétien also sounded friendly to the U.S. position yesterday in the Commons when he refused NDP Leader Alexa McDonough's challenge to unequivocally declare Canada's opposition to NMD. Mr. Chrétien said he told Mr. Bush that "this system has to be developed in a way that will not be offensive to the Russians and the Chinese." The Americans know this "and they said they will take the time to do the proper consultation before they proceed. I know it will take some time," the Prime Minister said.

The Bush administration has promised to consult with allies but has also vowed to deploy, regardless of whether those consultations satisfy Moscow, Beijing or the allies. Officially, Ottawa's policy is unchanged because the Liberal government insists it has no policy, only concerns that NMD could spark proliferation, especially if Washington makes good on its threat to tear up the ABM over Moscow's objections and equally staunch opposition from Beijing, which fears such a system would render its small ballistic-missile threat ineffective.

But Ottawa's tone has changed steadily in the scant few weeks since it became clear that Mr. Bush is determined to deploy the system, regardless of support from U.S. allies, who have been, to date, mostly hostile to it.

Ottawa is still some distance from embracing NMD, but the nuanced change in tone has made early endorsement possible.

The Prime Minister's comments this week are not the first indication that Ottawa was repositioning itself on NMD. Barely a week before Mr. Chrétien started to sound fuzzy, if not yet quite warm, to NMD, Defence Minister Art Eggleton was in Washington stressing the importance of the common continental defence arrangements between Canada and the United States.

"We do have a common contingent, we have NORAD, we have many defence agreements . . . in which we work together and we want to continue to work together," Mr. Eggleton said.

Although there remains widespread skepticism about NMD -- both in terms of the reality of the threat and the enormous technological difficulties of hitting a missile in space with another missile on only a few minutes notice -- there are risks for Canada if it actively opposes the scheme, according to its proponent.

"The train is leaving the station, either you get on it or stay behind shouting from the platform," a senior U.S. official told a high-level North Atlantic Treaty Organization delegation that included Canadians last week.

The message was clear: Those who support NMD would be part of the massive military-industrial development of the system, as well as being able to shelter under its protection.

That risk is higher for Canada than for the European allies because Washington intends that NORAD -- the bilateral North American Aerospace Defence Command -- will be the structure that runs NMD from its Cheyenne Mountain redoubt in Colorado.

If Ottawa were to spurn NMD, it could imperil Canada's role in NORAD, according to some senior Canadian military officers who worry that the government sees the antimissile shield as a problem rather than an opportunity.

Dallas Morning News

February 9, 2001

## **Oversight Of Virus Experiments Assailed**

### ***Security spokesman says remedies in works***

By Associated Press

WASHINGTON – Experiments with lethal viruses and bacteria conducted at federal weapons labs lacked required oversight and controls, raising concern about potential risk to workers and the public, an Energy Department report has found.

The investigation by the department's inspector general uncovered potential safety and health concerns involving a \$90 million-a-year program that was created to prepare and develop countermeasures to biological attacks.

The activities, spread across eight federal research labs, have "lacked organization, coordination and direction," according to the report, made public Thursday. It cited other shortcomings, including a lack of "appropriate federal



oversight," lax reporting and communications, and inconsistent policies and procedures when it came to handling biological materials.

The yearlong investigation found no evidence of harm to any employees or the public. But the lax procedures raise the risk of such exposure, the report said.

The experiments involve handling some of the most lethal biological agents known, including organisms that cause anthrax, the plague and botulism.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta controls the handling of these materials, including shipments and the safeguards required at the facilities. But Energy Department investigators found that some laboratories did not follow the CDC's strict requirements for registering the biological materials.

Others did not properly screen biological agents received at the facilities, establish proper procedures for handling damaged packages, or inform Energy Department officials that experiments were being conducted.

At the Brookhaven lab in New York, botulinum toxin, which is fatal if inhaled or absorbed through the skin, was "routinely removed from its containment" in an area not approved by the CDC for work involving the material.

Officials with the Energy Department's office in Albuquerque, N.M., did not know that biological experiments were being conducted at two of the labs, Sandia and Los Alamos in New Mexico, the report said. The biological activities at the labs "fell through the cracks," one official told investigators.

Darwin Morgan, a spokesman for the Energy Department's National Nuclear Security Agency, said most of the deficiencies were "procedural" and that many have been corrected or are in the process of being fixed.

Inside The Air Force

February 9, 2001

Pg. 1

## **DOD Withholds Money For Air Force Extended Range Cruise Missiles**

The Defense Department is withholding \$40 million appropriated by Congress last year for the Air Force's Extended Range Cruise Missile program, according to DOD and Air Force officials.

The ERCM program was awarded the funding by Congress in the fiscal year 2001 Defense Authorization Act.

However, sources tell Inside the Air Force that Pentagon comptroller officials and the DOD acquisition, technology and logistics office are demanding details on the ERCM procurement strategy before they approve the release of the funding.

"They have to get the blessing from the acquisition folks," said a Pentagon official. "The Air Force has never been through this before [with cruise missiles] -- and we need to know what it's going to need, who is going to carry it, and who is going to shoot it."

However, according to an Air Force acquisition official, a lack of funding is the reason the service hasn't been able to provide the details required by the Pentagon. "It's a perfectly reasonable thing on their part to request [program specifics]," he said. "But hey, we need the money, guys."

"It's kind of a chicken and the egg thing -- we need the money to start the [system program office]. Right now we're trying to come up with a program, but you need money to build" that, he said.

A meeting of DOD and ERCM acquisition officials to resolve the debate has been postponed twice, the official said.

The meeting is scheduled for later this month.

The Air Force official declined to say which office within DOD has been putting forth the most demands on the service, but a Pentagon official said the comptroller's office needs to hear answers about the service's proposed use of the ERCMs before it will release the money.

The Air Force "never ever intended to get cruise missiles," the official said. "All of the conventional cruise missile money was appropriated by Congress. Whoever's in charge of cruise missiles there never had to budget" for the program, he said.

The DOD official suggested the addition of extended-range cruise missiles to the Air Force's inventory could risk the future of one of the service's highest priorities -- the procurement of the F-22.

"The last thing in the world the Air Force wants is a cruise missile," he said. "It threatens the F-22. If you have a cruise missile that goes long range, what do you need an F-22 for?"

The ERCM was requested on the Air Force's fiscal year 2001 unfunded priorities list, however. Comptroller and acquisition officials also need to know how the Air Force intends to balance the use in combat of Joint Direct Attack Munitions, Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles and ERCMs, he said.

The Air Force expects the ERCMs will supplement its dwindling supply of Conventional Air-Launched Cruise Missiles. Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Boeing and Orbital Sciences are vying for the prime ERCM contract (ITAF, Nov. 3, 2000, p1).

"Our inventory is not where it needs to be," the Air Force official said, adding that ERCM's mission is simply "to fill the bins."

"Our mission is not to build the sexiest, state-of-the-art missile," he said. "We need to match the current capability with an extended range."

The missile's precise mission and capabilities are classified, as are those of all U.S. cruise missiles. CALCM's range is thought to be in excess of 680 miles, which, based on prior service leadership estimates, would put an extended-range version in the neighborhood of 1,400 miles.

The likely platform for the missile is the B-52 bomber, which fires CALCMs.

While the Air Force had planned to pick a winner for the ERCM contract in the third quarter of FY-01, the Air Force official said the estimated date for source selection has slipped to August.

"We plan to be on contract by this summer," he said, noting that once DOD has provided the \$40 million appropriated by Congress, the process should move more rapidly. Program officials want production to take place "in the fastest, most affordable way possible," he said.

In the short term, he argued, "We're not asking for additional funds, just the ones already appropriated. We're trying to move out as fast as humanly possible."

Still, the acquisition official said the service will "definitely" request additional funding in FY-02. He noted that the Air Force plans to produce approximately 600 missiles, and doing so is "definitely going to cost more" than \$40 million, he said.

A Pentagon official noted that the total amount of ERCM funding the Air Force has discussed is about \$250 million -- and this, he said, is insufficient to cover likely program costs.

"Right up front they don't have enough money to develop a program," he said.

"We can't develop a horse and buggy in this town for \$250 million," he added.

The most recent ERCM unit production cost estimate is about \$650,000, less than half that of a CALCM. A defense industry official said that the higher costs for CALCMs might stem from the need to remove the nuclear components from the CALCM missile shells before they are converted into conventional missiles (see related story).

The Air Force official said that the acquisition strategy has not been finalized, and likely cannot be until the initial funding is released.

"Certainly [ERCM use] will be driven by the warfighter mission needs," he said. "It's a matter of how close you want to get to the target" before firing.

"It's not my mission to determine the warfighter mission; my job on the acquisition side of the fence is to buy whatever they're asking for -- and to find the most affordable and fastest way to get them" what they need, he said. He added B-52s may carry both CALCMs and ERCMs once the extended-range missile has reached production, but how soon the service will use up its remaining CALCM supply cannot be predicted.

"It all depends on how fast we use the CALCM," he said. "For future use rates you'd need a crystal ball."

The official said he hopes the delay in getting the ERCM funds will be resolved soon.

"It's definitely not something we expected resistance on," he said. "We thought, 'hey, it's approved; we'll get it' -- silly me."

*-- David Smalley*

## **Alamo Alert plans how to thwart work of bioterrorist**

by Dewey Mitchell  
Wilford Hall Public Affairs

02/06/01 - LACKLAND AIR FORCE BASE, Texas (AFPN) -- A three-day exercise called Alamo Alert was held here Jan. 31 to Feb. 2, and focused on bioterrorism and what communities could do to thwart potential attacks.

Officials worked toward finding answers and paving the way for interaction between local, state and federal agencies as a model for other cities to follow.

"It's about our capability -- it's important to know what the threat is and what our capability is," said Maj. Gen. Daniel James III, Texas National Guard adjutant general. "If we're going to be successful, we had to start talking about it, planning it, exercising it. That's the only way we're going to get better at it."

The exercise was sponsored by the Texas National Guard, Region 8 of the Texas Department of Health, and the city of San Antonio. It was conducted by the Development Center for Operational Medicine at Brooks Air Force Base, Texas. Activities were held here and at nearby Kelly AFB.

"The level of support and participation was off the scale, terrific," said Col. (Dr.) Rasa Silenas, Brooks DCOM director. "What Air Force people need to understand is that force protection doesn't stop at the gate, it goes with you to the store, baseball game and everywhere you go. With Alamo Alert, we've delivered a baby. Now we've got to bring it up."

Alamo Alert explored city, county, state and federal responses to a contagious biological agent. Among the local medical response forces were two military hospitals that participate in the local trauma network: Wilford Hall Medical Center and Brooke Army Medical Center.

A Biological Threat Symposium was held on the first day of the exercise, Jan. 31, which gave an overview of biological agents. Experts discussed the medical, social, engineering and logistical issues following a biological event. Lt. Col. (Dr.) Matt Dolan, who heads Wilford Hall Medical Center's infectious disease unit, conducted the education seminar.

Local civilian and military leaders spent most of Feb. 1 conducting "what-if" drills, considering who would take what actions, and at what level.

Called a Leadership Table-Top Exercise, the goal of this exercise was to help merge the plans of all the different agencies, so they can work more easily together in the event of a real terrorist attack.

The contractor who ran the "table-top" exercise gave details of a specific attack and provided an open forum for the participants to explore plans and response procedures as they decided on courses of action to overcome the biological terrorist event.

Participants included city leaders, and representatives from the local fire department, police department, emergency services, emergency operations center, and state and local health department. People representing the FBI, legal, public affairs, Bexar County, Federal Emergency Management Agency, area bases, medical examiner, Red Cross, and hospital council, were also present.

Local, state and federal leaders met for almost two years planning the exercise. Officials consider San Antonio an excellent location for a bioterrorist exercise because of the presence of two military hospitals.

When asked what's next following the successful exercise just completed, Silenas said, "We would like to do a follow-on exercise. As Gen. (Paul) Carlton (Air Force surgeon general) stated during the exercise, we need to have another one of these to break the complex issues into chewable bites."